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Iñigo González­Ricoy and Axel Gosseries (eds.):  
Institutions for Future Generations 
Reviewed by Markus Rutsche
Doing justice to a collection of 24 articles within the confines of a short book review is a 
nigh-on impossible task, but I hope that 
by presenting a brief survey of its content 
I can at least draw some attention to it. 
Iñigo González-Ricoy and Axel Gosseries, 
the editors, deserve much praise from the 
outset for their laudable service of putting 
together what is (to my knowledge) the 
latest and to date perhaps most compre-
hensive volume on institutional respons-
es to the widespread problem of “short-
term ism”. They describe their project as 
an attempt to “advance and assess a variety 
of innovative institutional proposals to 
render policymaking […] more sensitive 
to the interests of future generations” (3); 
and it is in this broad spirit of applied po-
litical philosophy that the book combines 
empirically informed evaluations of existing approaches with 
largely normative considerations of yet-to-be-realised possibilities 
for institutionalising intergenerational justice.
Apart from its two separate introductions, which make for a very 
helpful and succinct overview of the issues at hand, the volume 
is organised around three different blocks: the first addresses the-
oretical and conceptual issues of intergenerational justice; the 
second discusses institutional proposals which aim specifically at 
promoting long-term policies; and the third explores ways of in-
creasing the long-termism of already existing institutions whose 
primary ends and purposes lie elsewhere.
Before raising a few concerns that do remain after a close reading 
of this book, a brief summary of its content might be in order. 
Following an excellent introduction by the editors and another 
one by Michael K. MacKenzie on the various sources and man-
ifestations of short-termism, Part II hits off with a “primer” on 
intergenerational justice by Nicholas Vrousalis, who offers some 
“tentative responses” (49) to the question of how, according to 
the standard theories, the benefits and burdens of progress ought 
to be measured (by preference satisfaction, resources, or capa-
bilities?) and intergenerationally distributed (according to the 
demands of equality, sufficiency, or maximum utility?). Next, 
Stéphane Zuber provides a more detailed look at how to measure 
intergenerational justice both at the design stage and at the opera-
tional stage of any given institution, and he does so by addressing 
the comparison of costs and benefits across generations as well as 
the more specific issue of just savings, figuring most prominently 
in Rawls’s Theory of Justice (§44). Whether it is at all possible for 
us, in any meaningful sense of the term, to actually “represent” 
future generations is a question asked, and 
eventually answered in the affirmative, in 
the following chapter by Anja Karnein. She 
argues that a modification of what she calls 
“surrogate representation” (90) is the most 
convincing way of approximating such an 
ideal without running into the several diffi-
culties that may arise from other approach-
es to representing future generations. With 
the goal of further conceptual clarification 
in mind, Axel Gosseries then embarks on 
an attempt to “clarify the link between 
generational sovereignty and specific insti-
tutional proposals” (98). He maintains that 
the numerous proposals contained in the 
collection at hand “only […] to a limited 
extent [restrict] the jurisdictional sover-
eignty of the generations that they affect” 
(109), not least because only few of them, 
as we shall see in passing, require any con-
stitutional entrenchment at all. 
Part III opens with a proposal which, as Ludvig Beckman and 
Fredrik Uggla freely admit, is “not exactly new” (117): the idea of 
an ombudsperson for future generations. To the regular readers of 
this journal, this idea will be indeed rather familiar; however, the 
way in which the authors argue for its feasibility, democratic legit-
imacy, and possible effectiveness is still original and generally con-
vincing, despite the obvious need for this proposal to be part of a 
bigger “package”. A more comprehensive view along those lines is 
offered in the subsequent chapter by Simon Caney, who discusses 
a package of five distinct reforms or policies that are designed 
to “enhance the accountability of the decision-making process in 
ways that take into account the interests of persons in the future” 
(135). Based in part on a system currently in place in Finland, 
he advocates, in turn, for a mandatory Governmental Manifesto 
on how to protect the interests of future generations, a Parlia-
mentary Committee to report on and scrutinise that manifesto, 
an annual “Visions for the Future” Day, an independent Council 
for the Future, and the employment of performance indicators 
to evaluate the attainment of long-term goals. A more economic 
perspective is then added by John Broom and Duncan K. Foley, 
who propose a World Climate Bank tasked with the issuance of 
“World Climate Bonds” in order to finance the long-overdue shift 
towards renewable energy. They suggest that eliminating the inef-
ficiency caused by greenhouse-gas emissions requires nothing less 
than a transformation of the global economy; and their argument 
that an international financial institution is needed to underwrite 
and to finance this transformation will surely resonate with many.
Moving on, Iñigo González-Ricoy provides an overview of consti-
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tutional provisions for securing the interests of future generations. 
(The article is not identical with a piece by the same author that 
appeared in issue 2/2016 of this journal.) He argues that consti-
tutional entrenchment can curb short-termism in three different 
ways: first, constitutionalising intergenerational provisions can 
raise the costs of deviating from such policies; second, it can re-
duce uncertainty with regard to the outcome of said policies; and 
third, it can go a long way in signalling the importance of these 
matters to each and every citizen by “coordinating [them] around 
new focal points as well as shaping their values and beliefs” (171). 
A somewhat different approach is taken by Dennis F. Thomp-
son, who suggests that we should “establish an independent body 
whose members […] act as trustees charged with the responsibili-
ty of the political system.” (184) Echoing a metaphor from Hob-
bes’s Leviathan, he holds that democratic trusteeship prescribes 
“the institutional equivalent of bifocals” by allowing that citizens 
and their representatives “see clearly not only their own democrat-
ic interests but also those of future citizens.” (195) 
Marcel Szabó proposes the idea of a “Common Heritage Fund”, 
financed by a 1% tax on all international trade and tasked with 
the goal of “conserving the natural resources of the world for the 
next generations.” (197) While there are several antecedents to 
such an idea, most notably in the form of the UNESCO World 
Heritage Fund established in 1972, the author argues that adopt-
ing his proposal would move the international community “to-
wards a more balanced world order where the participating states 
pay due consideration to the differences existing between them 
[…], without losing sight of the enforcement of the interests of 
future generations.” (212) Another model for the representation 
of future generations is proposed and discussed by Kristian Ska-
gen Egeli, who contrasts his own “sub-majority rule model” with 
Dobson’s “restricted franchise model”. While both aim at promot-
ing future-oriented deliberations in representative democracies by 
raising public awareness about issues that will have a lasting im-
pact on the living conditions of future generations, Ekeli’s model 
is distinct in demanding that “at least one-third of the legislators 
[…] be granted two procedural rights in order to protect future 
interests” (214), namely, the power to delay legislation and the 
right to require referendums. In the concluding chapter of Part 
III, Chiara Cordelli and Rob Reich consider ways in which phil-
anthropic institutions may play a role in serving intergenerational 
justice. They argue that, given their unusual accountability struc-
tures and their largely private nature, such institutions are unique-
ly well-equipped for counteracting the phenomenon of democrat-
ic “presentism” as well as for supplementing and complementing 
political institutions seeking to do the same.
As mentioned above, Part IV of the volume consists of a number of 
papers discussing how institutions that “we” already have and that 
exist for their own distinct purpose (rather than those designed 
precisely with the aim of furthering long-termist policies) can be 
made more sensitive and responsive to the demands of intergener-
ational justice. It opens with an enquiry by Simon Niemeyer and 
Julia Jennstål into the question of how the institutionalisation of 
so-called “mini-publics”, consisting of “randomly selected citizens 
engaging in deliberation on decisions affecting intergenerational 
equity”, may further the effective inclusion of future generations 
and thereby overcome a perceived “value-action gap” by means of 
a “discursive representation of their interests” (247). In order for 
such an idea to be successful, the authors argue that a disposition 
to “being open to all relevant arguments” (247) is required on be-
half of its participants. They contend that achieving such a stance 
is, practically speaking, far from unrealistic, despite the obvious 
problems and challenges involved in this. Juliana Bidadanure 
scrutinises another proposal that has been under intense consid-
eration on the pages of earlier issues of the IGJR, and which can 
be said to have gained substantive momentum as of late: the in-
troduction of “youth quotas” in parliaments as a means of “proxy 
representation” of future generations. (The article is not identi-
cal, neither in form nor in substance, with a piece published by 
the same author in issue 2/2015 of this journal.) She argues that, 
from a perspective of intergenerational justice in particular, the 
inclusion of more young people in parliaments is desirable on the 
grounds that they have a “higher stake” in the future and that they 
are “more concerned” by it than older people (the distinction be-
tween these two arguments remains a bit unclear). Such inclusion 
is also desirable because greater generational diversity is “likely to 
increase the competence of parliaments in solving complex prob-
lems” (268).
In his second contribution to the volume, Michael K. MacKenzie 
entertains the idea of an additional, randomly selected legislative 
chamber with a high degree of rotation among its membership 
(recruited from the entire citizenry) and mostly a general type of 
“soft power” at its disposal. He argues, rather persuasively, that 
a general-purpose institution of this kind would be “well-posi-
tioned to help counterbalance some of the short-term tendencies 
associated with elected chambers” (283). Claudio López-Guer-
ra’s proposal in the following chapter is based on the intuition 
that “politicians ought to have a larger stake in the consequences 
of their own decisions.” (299) He suggests that a condition be 
imposed on the occupancy of public office according to which 
“politicians would agree to exclusively use certain public servic-
es, during and after their term in office.” (29) The rationale for 
this proposal is based on an analogy with airline pilots, who the 
author rightfully claims are “strongly motivated to fly […] safely 
because their own lives are on the line.” (299) While the analogy 
might only go so far and looks likely to encounter severe issues 
of feasibility both in legal and political terms, the idea of “pilot-
ing” responsibility in such a way is surely an intriguing one and 
deserves further consideration. As many have pointed out before, 
the fact that an idea might seem far-fetched at first and even un-
likely to ever garner sufficient support for its realisation does not 
necessarily make it any less interesting or worthy of discussion, 
and rightly so.
Karl Widerquist introduces the idea of a “people’s endowment” in 
order to establish “the precedent that the people as a whole own 
the environment and the resources within it.” (327) He suggests 
that half the revenue derived from such an endowment ought to 
be used for government spending and half for an unconditional 
basic income, and he maintains that doing so will “help create an 
institutional structure that more fairly shares the benefits of our 
economy with […] all people, living today and in the future.” 
(327) Under the label of “democratic firms”, Virginie Pérotin re-
ignites the idea of “firms owned and managed by their employees” 
(331), more commonly known as co-operatives, and argues that 
these would help mitigate many of the short-term biases typically 
associated with for-profit corporations. She holds that not only 
would there be direct benefits for future generations in that, inter 
alia, the accumulated capital of such firms could not be eaten up, 
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as it were, by its very own stakeholders (thereby effectively render-
ing those firms into “collective goods”), but that there would also 
be benefits of a rather indirect kind by establishing a longer time 
horizon for job stability as well as by ensuring a closer monitoring 
of management. 
Next, Jonathan White turns to the issue of political parties and to 
the question of how to facilitate their taking on more long-termist 
views. His proposal amounts to outlining a new conception of 
the party constitution, which he argues (in terms that will ring 
familiar to the readers of this journal) ought to be conceived as 
“living” (353) – that is, as ever expanding and re-directing itself 
over time as new issues come and go. He adds to this the require-
ment that parties participate in efforts to archive and to publicise 
whatever prior policy commitments they might have engaged in 
historically, thereby enhancing their overall accountability. One 
cannot help but think, however, that this proposal must have 
grown out of the unusual configuration of recent British politics, 
for the practice of outsourcing and institutionalising the task of 
archiving a party’s history is indeed quite a common one in many 
countries including – but not limited to – Germany. 
Turning to another arena, how may institutions of higher educa-
tion do their share in encouraging long-termist decision-making? 
Danielle Zwarthoed suggests that the representation of both stu-
dents and, especially, alumni be expanded significantly on uni-
versities’ governing bodies – a move she argues would go a long 
way in enhancing the long-termist orientation and accountability 
of not just higher education, but of other types of educational 
institutions as well. Joakim Sandberg offers a proposal according 
to which pension funds, thanks to their huge influence on com-
merce and society as a whole, ought to “take a stronger responsi-
bility for the effects of corporate activities on future generations” 
(385). To this end, he suggests that instead of focusing on “fi-
duciary duty”, pension funds be given “independent social and 
environmental obligations” such that they be (legally) required 
to take into account their own impact on future generations and 
fragile stakeholders, and to do so “irrespective of whether this is in 
the beneficiaries’ interest” (394). Whether the interests of future 
generations must always outweigh those of present beneficiaries, 
or whether it might in fact be possible to consistently serve them 
both at once, is a question that is unfortunately not taken up by 
the author. In the final contribution to this volume, Thomas Bau-
din and Paula Gobbi discuss the strongly contested issue of family 
planning. They argue that since the individually desired degree of 
fertility is strongly driven by what they call “deep” determinants 
(such as a mother’s education, child mortality rates, and other fac-
tors), institutional efforts to reduce fertility in developing coun-
tries should focus more on shaping the economic and educational 
conditions to foster this outcome, rather than merely providing 
the means (i.e., birth control) for doing so.
As this all-too-brief summary shows, there is quite a lot happen-
ing in this book, and readers will doubtless find themselves deeply 
enriched and inspired by the multitude of approaches and ideas 
on how to institutionalise justice for future generations that are 
presented on its pages. What clearly emerges from the contribu-
tions to this volume is that there are indeed, as the saying goes, 
many rooms in the house of intergenerational justice, and that the 
responses to the problem are just as manifold and complex as the 
problem itself. The editors are to be commended for their efforts 
in bringing all of these together, and the collection will surely 
serve as a starting point of debates on institutions for intergenera-
tional justice for many years to come.
A minor quarrel, rather than a substantive point of contention, 
is that the volume provides few, if any insights on how to move 
from the level of creative imagination to actual implementation. 
Issues of feasibility and stability are very rarely discussed through-
out the book, and while the institutional designs presented in it 
are certainly valuable in and of themselves, the general absence 
of such considerations does leave something to be desired (for 
the record, this is not true of all chapters). We also learn very 
little about institutions in the sense of “regimes”, that is, as sets 
of rather fixed and socially shared rules and norms that do not 
possess any agency in and of themselves (think of marriage, or 
friendship), and how these might figure in attempts to overcome 
the short-termism that has taken hold of so much of our society 
and our politics. And even though the authors implicitly seem to 
share a mostly commonsensical view of what institutions actually 
are, conceptually speaking, and how they may work to shape and 
to enforce attitudes, preferences, and eventually policies, there is 
little in the way of theoretical elaboration that would make any 
of this agreement explicit – let alone show what it is that holds 
the various proposals together, beyond their mere juxtaposition. 
But perhaps this is too much to ask. Those small misgivings aside, 
however, this volume does an excellent service to students and 
scholars of intergenerational justice alike, and one can only hope 
that it will find many vigilant and engaged readers.
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